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Noncitizens’ Remedies Lost?:
Accountability for Overreaching in Immigration
Enforcement
*

Peter Margulies

Remedies for government overreaching in immigration cases
have always embodied a dilemma. On the one hand, the government
sometimes acts excessively, failing to provide allegedly removable
1
2
noncitizens with appropriate process, using excessive force in arrests,
3
or detaining noncitizens too long or under poor conditions. On the
other hand, particularly since the government has legitimate concerns
about both immigration violations and the threat of terrorism from
noncitizens, overly broad or expansive remedies may chill government
4
efforts and leave the nation vulnerable. While such competing con5
cerns exist in any area involving suits against government officials,
*
Professor of Law, Roger Williams University. I thank participants at the Florida International University School of Law Immigration Law Conference, particularly Ediberto Roman and
the staff of the Law Review, for conversations that made this Article possible; all mistakes are
my own.
1
See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 576-77 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
3409 (2010).
2
See Argueta v. U.S. Immigrations & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011); cf.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (permitting suit for damages against federal agents who behaved in abusive and insulting fashion during
search of residence).
3
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (reciting facts but rejecting liability); PETER
MARGULIES, LAW’S DETOUR: JUSTICE DISPLACED IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 29 (2010);
DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON
TERROR 30-31 (2007) (discussing the post-9/11 roundup of undocumented noncitizens from
Middle East and South Asia, most of whom had no ties to terrorism); see also DANIEL
KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 8-9 (2007).
4
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (declining to impose supervisory liability for officials who
allegedly knew about, but failed to address abusive conditions of confinement).
5
Compare George D. Brown, Accountability, Liability, and the War on Terror — Constitutional Tort Suits as Truth and Reconciliation Vehicles, 63 FLA. L. REV. 193, 234-37 (2011) (warning of unintended effects of tort liability), and Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government Lawyers for
Giving Dubious Legal Advice in a National Security Crisis: Notes on How (Not) to Become a
Banana Republic, __ ST. THOMAS L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2011) (on file with author) (critiquing
suits for damages against officials as chilling exercise of judgment), with Alexander A. Reinert,
Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and its Consequences for the Individual Liability

319

320

FIU Law Review

[6:319

these concerns are particularly salient in the immigration context.
This brief paper aims to carve out space where those injured by government overreaching can seek relief, without creating the negative
externalities that would hamper legitimate enforcement efforts.
The dilemma parallels the relationship in human inference between myopia and hindsight bias. Remedies such as damage suits are
6
useful for deterring the myopia that can afflict government officials.
Like other human beings, officials tend to have a limited time horizon.
Events and concerns that are immediate and vivid receive a disproportionate share of attention, while intermediate and long-term ef7
fects fade from view. Too often, officials act on short-term concerns,
with a hasty consideration of techniques that seem expedient or require less time, without pondering the effectiveness of those techniques. The groundbreaking case that established law enforcement
officials’ liability under the United States Constitution involved
agents forcing their way into a home and humiliating a suspect in
8
front of his family. The agents never considered whether obtaining a
warrant or securing the suspect’s consent – both techniques used repeatedly – would have been appropriate. Some of this same heedless9
ness has seeped into immigration enforcement.

Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2010) (arguing that suits for damages promote accountability); see
also Stephen I. Vladeck, Justice Jackson, the Memory of Internment, and the Rule of Law After
the Bush Administration, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW: THE RULE OF LAW AND
THE PROSECUTION OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 183, 201-06 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain
eds., 2010) (discussing risks and benefits of spectrum of sanctions, including suits for damages);
cf. Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions,
and the Rule of Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 195 (2010) (courts should not categorically preclude or
allow suits for damages against officials, but instead should analyze whether damage action in
particular context would encourage alternatives to overreaching).
6
See Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight, supra note 5, at 204-11.
7
See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 45-46 (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000) (people inappropriately discount future costs); Daniel Read, Intertemporal Choice, in
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 424, 428-29 (Derek J. Koehler
& Nigel Harvey eds., 2004) (individuals prefer “smaller-sooner reward,” even when rational
person would wait longer for significantly larger pay-off); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and
Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997) (people employ “commitment mechanisms”
such as insurance policies or savings plans to correct for tendency to unduly discount the future);
George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Projection Bias in Predicting Future
Utility, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1209 (2003) (analyzing errors in discounting over time).
8
See also James E. Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith
Resnik eds., 2010) (discussing background of Bivens case).
9
See Douglas v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (Plaintiff, who had
obtained derivative citizenship through mother’s naturalization, was needlessly detained for
more than eight months on immigration charges because when he submitted detailed letter to
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent regarding his citizenship
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10

However, a countervailing value here is hindsight bias. Human
beings often believe that harms are preventable. In fact, a dense web
of circumstance often blocks a different result. Courts review official
decisions from the cozy recliner of retrospect. Hindsight bias comes
with the territory. Hemmed in by fear of hindsight bias, immigration
enforcement officials would lose the flexible judgment that decisive
action requires. By chilling difficult decisions that serve the public
interest, excessive liability would trigger substantial opportunity costs.
11
Courts have constrained damage suits to forestall this possibility.
Courts have generally been more considerate about the dangers
of hindsight bias than the risks of myopia. As a result, both Congress
and the courts have constrained damage suits in a number of ways.
Congress has written language into the Immigration and Nationality
Act that could be read to severely restrict damage suits as well as oth12
er litigation. Moreover, courts generally require that a plaintiff first
13
exhaust administrative remedies. In addition, a Bivens action against
a federal official cannot proceed if courts believe that “special factors
14
counsel[] hesitation” in allowing such a suit. Even if the plaintiffs
leap this hurdle, they must overcome the qualified immunity of the
official, which permits liability only if the official has acted in violation
15
of settled law. Plaintiffs who are stymied by these requirements may

status, the agent declined to look into matter and merely said, “Talk to the judge”; the court
granted summary judgment to Plaintiff on malicious prosecution claim).
10 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 7, at 95 [hereinafter Rachlinski, Positive Theory in Hindsight] (notions such as “hindsight . . . is ‘20/20’” stand for the proposition that
“[l]earning how the story ends . . . distort[s] our perception of what could have been predicted.”);
Neal J. Roese, Twisted Pair: Counterfactual Thinking and the Hindsight Bias, in BLACKWELL
HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 7, at 258, 260-61 [hereinafter
Roese, Twisted Pair] (because of hindsight bias, people “believe that an event was predictable
before it occurred even though for the perceiver it was not”).
11 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
12 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2006) (barring “any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien
arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders . . .”).
13 See El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 273 (D. Conn. 2008).
14 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396
(1971); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 576-77 (2d Cir.
2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
15 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807; Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); see also Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (allowing court to find that official had immunity due to absence of
clearly settled law without first determining whether plaintiff’s rights were violated); cf. Diana
Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117 (2009) (arguing that Pearson holding
encouraged undue deference for official decisions); Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and
the Stronger Case for Rights-First Constitutional Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. R. 595, 608-12
(2009) (discussing rationale for Pearson holding); see generally Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 SUP. CT. REV.
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be able to sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), but there,
another barrier awaits: the court must find that the challenged decision did not arise from a “discretionary function” of the agency that
16
courts should not second-guess.
These barriers are even more formidable in the immigration context. Courts often extend themselves to defer to officials in damage
17
suits involving immigration enforcement.
This compounds the
courts’ pervasive deference in the immigration arena. According to
precedent, Congress has plenary power over immigration, where it is
able to impose classifications that would violate equal protection in
18
any other realm. In addition, Bill of Rights guarantees mean far less
in the immigration setting. For example, uncertainty exists regarding
19
the First Amendment rights of aliens. Laxity also prevails for Fourth
Amendment rights – a search or seizure must be not only unreasonable, but egregiously so, to result in exclusion of evidence or sanctions
20
against the government.
The result of procedural and substantive restraints on suits for
damages is what I call the specificity two-step. To perform the specificity two-step, courts narrowly construe a term or element when that

281 [hereinafter Schuck, Suing Our Servants] (arguing that failure to curb damages actions leads
to undue official risk-aversion).
16 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006); see United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (construing
exception).
17 See Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011); see
generally Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1412-18
(2009) (analyzing rationale for deference in national security cases).
18 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). For critiques of the plenary power doctrine, see
KANSTROOM , supra note 3, at 113-16; Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1059-60 (1994); Linda Kelly, Preserving the
Fundamental Right to Family Unity: Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community
Ties in the Battle of Plenary Power Versus Aliens’ Rights, 41 VILL. L. REV. 725 (1996); see also
Ediberto Román & Theron Simmons, Membership Denied: Subordination and Subjugation Under United States Expansionism, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437 (2002) (critiquing judicial deference
to Congress in administration of territories); see generally GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO
THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996) (analyzing consequences of territoriality under Constitution); cf. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE
L.J. 545 (1990) (arguing that courts have developed approaches to statutory interpretation to
mitigate harshness to noncitizens caused by plenary power doctrine).
19 See Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 715
(2003) (“Congress may to some extent infringe on the rights on noncitizens in ways that would
be impermissible if done to citizens.”).
20 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (Fourth Amendment exclusionary does not ordinarily apply in removal proceedings, but
might apply in context of “egregious” violations); Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive Operations and the
Fourth Amendment: Representing Immigrants Arrested in Warrantless Home Raids, 89 N.C. L.
REV. 507 (2011).
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serves government interests, but pivot to a broader construction when
a narrower approach would hold government accountable. For example, in adjudicating claims that officials did not adequately supervise
subordinates in immigration enforcement, one court has narrowly
construed the notice that officials must receive of subordinates’ mis21
conduct. Because of this narrow reading, courts view even notice of
systemic problems as isolated anecdotes that do not trigger liability.
In contrast, in considering whether an agency sued under the FTCA
can claim that its acts were a discretionary function, courts have been
prone to finding that even isolated acts of heedless habit have sys22
temic implications that courts should not second-guess. The specificity two-step upsets law’s careful balance between official myopia and
hindsight bias.
To counter the specificity two-step, this Article suggests a sliding
scale test to address Bivens actions for damages against immigration
officials and the scope of the “discretionary function” exception to
liability under the FTCA. Instead of buying into categorical deference or interventionism, a sliding scale test provides a flexible means
for easing both myopia and hindsight bias. Use of a sliding scale has
significant implications for suits against immigration officials and
agencies. A sliding scale approach would narrowly define the “factors
counseling hesitation” that preclude Bivens actions. This narrow definition would allow for more fine-grained analysis of individual cases.
In suits against supervisors, the sliding scale approach would permit
liability if an official knew of ongoing violations by subordinates and
failed to act. In suits involving an alleged failure by supervisors to
train subordinates, the sliding scale approach would consider the preemployment experience of subordinate officials and the nature of the
interests affected by enforcement overreaching. In the qualified immunity context, the test would broadly define “clearly established
law” that overcomes immunity if the official’s actions were egregious,
and the opportunity costs of a decision for plaintiffs were low. Similarly, in the FTCA arena, the approach would narrowly define the
“discretionary function” exception when a decision for plaintiffs involved heedless habits whose modification would not alter policy deliberations.
The Article is in four parts. Part I discusses the relationship between remedies for official action and cognitive biases. Part II discusses threshold objections to suits for damages, such as exhaustion

21

See Argueta, 643 F.3d at 74-75.
See Castro v. United States, No. C-06-61, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9440, at *32 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
9, 2007), aff’d, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 902 (2011).
22
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and statutory bars to relief. It concludes that these concerns would
not preclude most suits. Part III discusses the present state of the law
and the specificity two-step, which threatens to sharply narrow relief
under Bivens and the FTCA for victims of overreaching in immigration enforcement. Part IV suggests the sliding scale approach as a
remedy for the pro-government tilt of the specificity two-step.
I. COGNITIVE BIASES AND REMEDIES
Humans are subject to cognitive biases that distort decisionmak23
ing. One bias is myopia, which dwells on short-term outcomes with
steep discounting of future results. Another is hindsight bias, which
makes every official error seem preventable and every official a dunce
for failing to head off mistakes. Balancing these biases is both challenging and necessary in fashioning remedies.
The Framers appreciated the perils of myopia. Hamilton commented that legislatures were subject to the “effects of occasional ill
24
humors in the society.” Since the political branches are fickle, popular whim or paranoia can lead to excessively volatile government.
Courts can supply a more extended perspective to curb these “pendu25
lar swings.”
Actions for damages also play a significant part in remedies for
myopia. Dating back to the Founding Era, courts have awarded mon26
etary relief to individuals injured by official action. More recently, in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcot27
ics, the Court held that a victim of an unreasonable search could recover damages.
Yet myopia is not the only bias relevant to remedies: a countervailing factor is the danger of hindsight bias. Hindsight bias heightens
23 The following account is based on Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight, supra note 5,
at 204-11.
24 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
25 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008).
26 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (monetary relief
ordered for improper seizure of neutral vessel); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 173, 177,
179 (1804) (damages ordered for seizure of vessel in violation of a statute); The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677 (1900) (ordering monetary relief for owner of a coastal fishing vessel seized during
Spanish-American war); see also Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814) (ordering
relief from official’s attempt during War of 1812 to condemn as enemy property without congressional authorization cargo on a vessel chartered by a British company); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth,
The President’s Power to Detain “Enemy Combatants”: Modern Lessons from Mr. Madison’s
Forgotten War, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1567, 1597-1607 (2004) (analyzing Brown). But see Robert
Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State
Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 67-72 (1999) (discussing limits of early decisions
regarding monetary relief).
27 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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the perceived likelihood that another person could have prevented
28
29
harm. In reality, harm often emerges from a confluence of causes.
Officials weary of continual second-guessing will often “play it safe,”
shrinking from tough decisions. To cope with hindsight bias, courts
have taken a range of measures. They have granted officials qualified
immunity that shields those who have not violated “clearly settled”
30
law. Even more fundamentally, they have barred lawsuits with factors, such as national security, that “counsel hesitation” about the ap31
propriateness of a damages remedy. The FTCA similarly bars law32
33
suits concerning the military or the formulation of policy.
Hindsight bias, like myopia, dovetails with other cognitive flaws
34
such as the availability heuristic. In the imperfect realm of human
inference, vivid images affect assessments of probability: an individual
who recalls a vivid event with its accompanying imagery will exaggerate the likelihood of that event’s recurrence, while discounting the
likelihood of more mundane events. For example, people exaggerate
the probability of harm stemming from air travel because the images
35
of plane crashes and aviation disasters are so memorable. On the
other hand, most people markedly underestimate the likelihood of
harm stemming from automobile accidents. Paradoxically, one reason
for this lowered estimate is the ordinary nature of car accidents – the36
se mishaps are too pervasive to be remarkable. Similarly, a vivid
harm that has already occurred serves as an “anchor” for assessment

28 See Rachlinski, Positive Theory in Hindsight, supra note 10; Roese, Twisted Pair, supra
note 10, at 258.
29 See W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against
Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 300 (1998) (juries err in assessing liability for low-probability but high-stakes events). But see CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS
ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA 109-12 (2001) (praising practical wisdom and sound moral judgment
in jury verdicts).
30 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074
(2011); Brown, supra note 5; Schuck, Suing Our Servants, supra note 15; cf. Vladeck, supra note 5
(recommending caution in paring away remedies).
31 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 580 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
32 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
33 See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (interpreting FTCA’s “discretionary
function” exception to liability).
34 See Gideon Keren & Karl H. Teigen, Yet Another Look at the Heuristics and Biases
Approach, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 7, at
89, 97 (noting that vivid risks skew judgments of probability).
35 See Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE
L.J. 61, 62-70 (2002).
36 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics, Biases, and Governance, in BLACKWELL
HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 7, at 567, 575-76 [hereinafter
Rachlinski, Heuristics and Governance].
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of the chain of events that failed to prevent that harm. With a vivid
harm as the anchor, viewers typically fault those acts or omissions,
even when officials acted reasonably based on the information available to them. This sentiment, if allowed to proceed unhindered, would
result in damages judgments that would chill official decisions. To
avoid this problem, Congress and the courts have shielded executive
decisionmaking. A court will dismiss a suit for damages for violation
of the Constitution if the court believes that the context of the case
includes “factors counseling hesitation” such as the possibility of dis38
closure of national security information. If a plaintiff leaps this hurdle, courts have ruled that officials retain qualified immunity from suit
39
unless they have violated “clearly settled” law. When a plaintiff sues
the United States under the FTCA because of alleged official wrongdoing, Congress has declined to waive the government’s sovereign
40
immunity when the decision involves a “discretionary function.”
Immigration is in need of curbs on myopia. Too often, government action against immigrants seems driven by the need to demonstrate that officials are doing something, anything, to deal with per41
ceived threats. Moreover, just as for Bivens, the remedy for nonciti42
zen subjects of government overreaching is “damages or nothing.” A
noncitizen who has been victimized by overreaching in immigration
enforcement often has no remedy because the Supreme Court has
43
severely limited the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings.

37 On anchoring, see Daniel Kahneman, Ilana Ritov & David Schkade, Economic Preferences or Attitude Expressions?: An Analysis of Dollar Responses to Public Issues, in CHOICES,
VALUES, AND FRAMES, 642, 665-68 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); Gretchen B.
Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Anchoring, Activation, and the Construction of Values, 79
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 115, 144 (1999); cf. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Governance, supra note 36, at 569 (noting marked increase in research subjects’ view
of need to take precautions once researchers told subjects that flood with ten percent probability
of occurrence in particular year had actually happened).
38 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 576-77 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
3409 (2010).
39 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074
(2011).
40 See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991).
41 See KANSTROOM, supra note 3, at 147-48 (citing rationale for post-World War I raids
against suspected noncitizen seditionists ordered by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer).
42 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410
(Harlan, J., concurring); see also Brown, supra note 5, at 851-52 (discussing relationship between
Harlan’s position and practice of implying private rights of action in statutes).
43 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); cf. Treadwell, supra note 20 (discussing
abuses in immigration searches); Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations
and the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081 (2008); Katherine Evans, The ICE Storm
in U.S. Homes: An Urgent Call for Policy Change, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 561 (2009);
Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the “Law of the Land”: United
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While the Court in Lopez-Mendoza contended that federal immigration officials had successfully implemented a “comprehensive scheme
44
for deterring Fourth Amendment violations,” the Court may have
been too optimistic. In the traditional enforcement context of a
workplace raid, enforcement questioning is often based on behavioral
cues that can be ambiguous and susceptible to subjective interpreta45
tion. A trained agent may well be able to interpret these cues effectively in most circumstances, reducing the risk of false positives – individuals thought to be undocumented who are actually citizens or legal
residents. However, agents are human, and mistakes are likely. The
Lopez-Mendoza Court asserted that the immigration enforcement
46
authorities had a procedure in place for disciplining errant agents.
However, the Court did not disclose how many times and with what
rate of success this procedure had been used. In the comparable case
47
of errant immigration judges, discipline has historically been lax.
That said, immigration cannot entail unduly broad remedies for
fear of chilling officials dealing with genuine threats. Remedies
should not require officials to second-guess themselves continually in
individual cases despite the caseload pressure created by well over a
48
million cases annually. The threat of liability for damages could impair the timely processing of those cases or tempt officials to look the
other way at obvious illegality. Neither result would serve the public
interest.
II. THRESHOLD BARRIERS: EXHAUSTION AND STATUTORY
PRECLUSION
Before exploring obstacles to suits for damages in greater detail,
it will be useful to deal with threshold barriers to such relief. These
barriers include exhaustion and statutory preclusion. The following
paragraphs deal with each in turn.

States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010).
44 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1045.
45 Id. at 1037 (noting that appellee Sandoval-Sanchez had appeared “evasive” and sought
to avoid questioning by immigration agent).
46 Id.
47 For discussions of systemic flaws in decisions by immigration judges, see Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench: An Ethical Perspective, 73 BROOKLYN L. REV. 467 (2008);
cf. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities
in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007); Linda Kelly Hill, Holding the Due Process
Line for Asylum, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 85 (2007); Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War
on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369 (2006).
48 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1049; Schuck, Suing Our Servants, supra note 15; Brown,
supra note 5.
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A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Exhaustion is often a problem with litigation concerning particular results in administrative proceedings. When claimants for particular relief, such as receipt of government benefits, seek recourse in federal court without first petitioning the agency with primary jurisdiction over their claims, courts typically require claimants to exhaust
49
their administrative remedies. Exhaustion provides courts with a
more complete record on which to base their decision. It also allows
administrative agencies “first crack” at a case, which enhances agency
expertise and vindicates Congress’s design in conferring jurisdiction
50
on the agency. However, exhaustion should not be a problem in
damages suits over immigration overreaching. In these cases, the
claimant is not seeking to litigate a question that the agency decides,
51
such as the noncitizen’s removability. The noncitizen’s present immigration status is rarely, if ever, at issue in suits for damages. Instead,
the claimant is litigating the collateral question of the lawfulness of
52
immigration enforcement. Because of the limited reach of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings, even clear violations will
rarely affect the noncitizen’s removal. Such exhaustion should not be
required.
B.

The REAL ID Act and 1996 Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction

The next question is whether Congress has barred jurisdiction
over the claim pursuant to provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Congress has repeatedly legislated to streamline the
removal process, believing that judicial review of removal outside of
specific channels could cause delay and eventually bring the process
53
to a halt. These provisions guard against a multiplicity of judgments
on the central issue of a noncitizen’s deportability. However, these
provisions do not bar a properly framed damage suit.
The most important provision is section 1252(g), which bars “any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or
action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate
49 See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (discussing statutory exhaustion rule in
prisoner’s rights suits).
50 See Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from Environmental Cases, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 10-20 (1985).
51 See El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 273 (D. Conn. 2008)
(discussing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)).
52 Id.
53 See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
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54

cases, or execute removal orders . . . .” Section 1252(g) established a
procedure for judicial review of removal orders in the federal circuit
55
courts. To limit the impact of hindsight bias, Congress barred review
of decisions to initiate proceedings or execute deportation orders, reasoning that if the government’s effort to remove a noncitizen was
groundless, the appropriate forum for that determination was a removal proceeding in Immigration Court, subject to statutorily speci56
fied judicial review.
However, courts have often interpreted section 1252(g) narrowly.
The provision itself does not include any mention of suits for dam57
ages. Moreover, other claims, such as those involving the length of
conditions of detention or the circumstances of arrest, are not clearly
barred by section 1252(g). Decisions about arrest or detention are
“separate and discrete” from the commencement of deportation pro58
ceedings. This view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision
59
in Zadvydas v. Davis, in which the Court permitted a constitutional
and statutory challenge to indefinite detention of noncitizens whom
the government could not return to their country of origin because
that country had declined to accept them. At first blush, Zadvydas
involved a challenge to the execution of a removal order, or, at the
very least, to government action pending removal. However, the Zadvydas Court, which upheld the challenge, framed the issue not as execution of a removal order, but as the constitutionality of detention
60
when removal appeared impossible. A broad reading of section
1252(g) would have denied noncitizens access to the courts to test
61
their detention, thus triggering constitutional problems. Driven in
part by the need to avoid deciding whether Congress could limit such
access to the courts, courts have narrowly construed the statute, viewing claims of prolonged detention after entry of a removal order as
involving not execution of a removal order, but “failure to execute a
54

8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2006).
See Gerald L. Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review After the REAL ID Act of
2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133 (2006).
56 See Reno, 525 U.S. 471.
57 See El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 265 (D. Conn. 2008).
58 Id. at 266.
59 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
60 Id. at 688.
61 Cf. El Badrawi v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 2d 204, 223 (D. Conn. 2011); see also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60-61 (1932) (referring to canon that courts should construe statutes
to avoid constitutional problems); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 68081 (1986) (presumption that statutes does not preclude judicial review); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S.
592, 603-05 (1988); cf. Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the
Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107 (2009); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative
Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 924, 937-38 (1988).
55
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62

removal order.” Moreover, as one court noted, a suit for damages
after completion of a removal proceeding is collateral to that proceeding. It does not seek to “re-litigate” the removal proceeding and,
hence, poses no risk of the “deconstruction, fragmentation, and . . .
prolongation” of proceedings that the Supreme Court believed was
63
Congress’s principal concern. However, even a narrow reading of
section 1252(g) will bar a suit for damages where the noncitizen had
another remedy available that the Immigration and Nationality Act
64
specifically authorizes.
III. GUARDING OFFICIAL DISCRETION: BIVENS, THE FTCA, AND
COURTS’ “SPECIFICITY TWO-STEP”
Section 1252’s jurisdictional bar is only the beginning of the obstacles plaintiffs face. Both Bivens actions and suits under the FTCA
face further limits. Those limits form a pattern that I call the “specificity two-step.” In this maneuver, courts read a statutory term or doctrinal element narrowly when that construction serves the government. However, courts pivot to a broader reading of other terms
when that interpretation serves government interests. The specificity

62 El Badrawi, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 267 (emphasis added) (distinguishing Duamutef v. INS,
386 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2004)).
63 See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 487 (1999); cf. Sameer
Ahmed, Comment, INA Section 242(g): Immigration Agents, Immunity, and Damages Suits, 119
YALE L.J. 625 (2009); see also Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div. of Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), which
channels review of claims “arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove” a
noncitizen, does not bar claims that are independent of or collateral to removal decision; claims
that noncitizens arrested in factory raid were denied counsel were not collateral to removal
proceedings, and therefore had to be raised in the first instance in those proceedings).
64 See Sissoko v. Rocha, 509 F.3d 947, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2007) (in expedited removal where
detention was mandatory after entry of a deportation order, alien seeking release could have
filed habeas petition under section 1252(e)(2)(B), claiming that he had not yet received a hearing on the issue of his deportability); cf. Foster v. Townsley, 243 F.3d 210 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding
that section 1252(g) barred suit for damages against officials for removal of noncitizen who had
failed to appear for scheduled hearing and received in absentia removal order); Khorrami v.
Rolince, 493 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (N.D. Ill. 2007), appeal dismissed, 539 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that section 1252(g) barred claims for damages based on arrest and detention after start of
removal proceedings, but did not preclude claims based on interrogation by officials prior to
start of removal proceedings); see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 570 (2d Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010) (in case of alien who was detained briefly and then subject to “extraordinary rendition” to Syria, court declined to consider suit for damages because of concern
that suit would reveal sensitive information, but reserved decision on applicability of section
1252(g), noting that immigration officials may have undermined alien’s ability to seek alternative
remedy of habeas by hindering access to attorney and failing to timely serve alien with removal
order). But see Medina v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 2d 545, 554 (E.D. Va. 2000) (more expansive
availability of remedies).
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two-step upsets law’s careful balance between official myopia and
judicial second-guessing.
Recent cases reveal increased resort to the specificity two-step.
Courts have preserved a broad ambit for official discretion, precluding
Bivens actions when they find that the need for speedy and secret of65
ficial decisions “counsel[s] . . . hesitation” about remedying wrongs,
and barring FTCA suits when an act bears even a tangential relation66
ship to discretionary functions and hence to policy. Conversely,
courts require very specific evidence that officials had notice of facts
and law that should have tempered official decisions. In the realm of
facts, plaintiffs must submit proof that senior officials knew subordi67
nates’ lack of training could cause the misconduct alleged. In the
realm of law, a court may dismiss a suit on qualified immunity grounds
68
if case law did not squarely prohibit identical official conduct. While
each element of the specificity two-step sounds plausible in isolation,
the move makes the government’s advantage the principal touchstone
of interpretation in suits for damages against officials.
A. Bivens and Factors Counseling Hesitation
In immigration cases, courts have too readily cited the Bivens
language barring actions for damages because of “special factors
69
counselling hesitation.” This trend builds on the courts’ reluctance to
70
permit Bivens claims outside of specific, narrowly defined contexts.
The broad deference generally accorded to the government on immi71
gration matters exacerbates courts’ unwillingness to entertain immigration-related Bivens claims.
Bivens suits have foundered where they might exacerbate collective action problems or outrun the judiciary’s institutional competence. Collective action problems can occur if claimants use actions
for damages to hold out against a comprehensive remedial regime in

65
66

See Arar, 585 F.3d at 576-77.
See Castro v. United States, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 902

(2011).
67

See Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011).
See Labadie v. United States, No. C09-1276 MJP, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 62909 (W.D. Wash.
June 14, 2011).
69 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396
(1971).
70 See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
71 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); cf. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M.
Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009) (discussing interaction
of President’s use of power delegated by Congress and claims to inherent presidential authority
over some immigration matters).
68
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which Congress has provided for more limited relief. Courts have
also frequently expressed doubts about Bivens actions in the fluid
realms of national security and foreign affairs where executive branch
officials’ access to information may exceed the courts’ information73
gathering capabilities.
This rationale threatens to extinguish suits for damages in immigration matters, even where official misconduct appears egregious.
74
Consider Arar v. Ashcroft, in which the court held that “factors counselling hesitation”, such as the diplomatic fallout from embarrassment
to other nations and the risk of disclosure of state secrets, barred
claims related to the alleged rendition to Syria of a Canadian national
75
arrested during a layover at JFK airport. The court admitted that the
76
threshold was “remarkably low” for this determination. In precluding a remedy, the court declined to address whether safeguards such as
those in the Classified Information Procedures Act could have pro77
tected sensitive information.
At least one court has echoed Arar in precluding a Bivens remedy for alleged official misconduct with only a slender tie to national

72 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (social security disability claims); cf. Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980) (holding that availability of remedy under Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA) did not bar Bivens action); Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845 (2010) (availability of
remedy under FTCA barred Bivens action against officials of Public Health Service); cf. John F.
Preis, Constitutional Enforcement by Proxy, 95 VA. L. REV. 1663 (2009) (discussing cases).
73 Cf. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681 (1987) (refusing to authorize remedy for
victims of LSD experiments in military); see also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298 (1983)
(precluding suits for damages by minority service personnel claiming racial discrimination);
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (barring suits against United States for actions arising
out of military service); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002) (declining to consider suit
based on amorphous allegations that United States officials failed to provide plaintiff with information necessary to reduce impact of government lawbreaking abroad). For a more categorical ruling against such suits, see Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(precluding suit against President Reagan for alleged “Contra” abuses in Nicaragua); see generally Chesney, supra note 17 (discussing rationales for judicial deference).
74 585 F.3d 559, 580 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010) .
75 Id. at 573-76. Although the plaintiff had no links to terrorism, Syrian officials kept him
in a cell the length and breadth of a grave and beat him repeatedly. See Scott Shane, On Torture,
2 Messages and a High Political Cost, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 2007, at A18 (discussing case); U.S.
Policy in the Middle East: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 110-131
(2007) (documenting acknowledgment by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in response to
Rep. William Delahunt (D-MA), that handling of Arar matter triggered “appropriate” concerns).
For more on the Arar case and rendition, see MARGULIES, supra note 3, at 73-74; Margaret L.
Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1333 (2007).
76 585 F.3d at 574.
77 See Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight, supra note 5, at 224; Richard B. Zabel &
James J. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts,
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (2008), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Alumni_Affairs/USLSpursuit-justice.pdf (analyzing criminal prosecutions involving sensitive information).
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78

security policy. In El Badrawi v. Department of Homeland Security,
the court viewed Arar as precluding a Bivens claim by a noncitizen
against officials who had detained him for unarticulated national security reasons. The officials never formally charged the plaintiff with
security-related immigration violations, and the court determined that
the stated basis for the plaintiff’s arrest and detention conflicted with
79
applicable agency rules. Nevertheless, the court found that the officials’ mere mention of a national security link barred plaintiff’s Bivens
80
claim.
B.

Supervisory Liability

Viewed from the vantage point of courts’ broad invocation of national security concerns to justify preclusion of Bivens claims, courts’
handling of supervisory liability claims that survive the initial cut illustrates the second phase of the specificity two-step: the turn toward
narrow definitions. Balancing the need to curb both official myopia
and judicial second-guessing is particularly difficult with supervisory
liability. Sweeping supervisory liability would make senior officials
insurers for the wrongs of their subordinates and arguably make senior officials unduly risk-averse. Since undue risk-aversion can disserve
the public as much as risk-prone behavior can, this solution is unwise.
However, unduly lax standards for supervisors do not check the reckless conduct of subordinates.
81
82
Two recent cases, Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Connick v. Thompson,
suggest that the Supreme Court is veering toward the second extreme.
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court ruled that senior officials could not be
held liable for allegedly discriminatory conditions of confinement experienced by persons detained in the post-9/11 immigration roundup,

78 See El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 263-64 (D. Conn. 2008).
Declining to fully execute the specificity two-step, the court later awarded relief based on the
FTCA, asserting that officials had acted in violation of clear policies promulgated by immigration authorities. See El Badrawi v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D. Conn. 2011).
79 El Badrawi, 787 F. Supp. at 216-22 (finding that regulations contradicted officials’ assertion that Plaintiff, who had timely applied for an extension of his H-1B worker’s visa, was out of
status). The basis, if any, for the officials’ concerns is not clear from the record, although it was
apparently related to worries that Al Qaeda might use noncitizens in the United States to plot a
follow-up to the Madrid train bombings. Id. at 210. The State Department had earlier executed
a Certificate of Revocation of the plaintiff’s visa, but the certificate provided that the revocation
would only become effective once the plaintiff had left the United States. Id. at 209. The State
Department’s action, taken before the Madrid bombings, does not indicate that United States
authorities considered the plaintiff an imminent threat to national security.
80 El Badrawi, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 263-64.
81 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
82 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
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even if those officials were on notice of the poor conditions. For the
Court, supervisory liability was akin to respondeat superior, even
though respondeat superior imposes a far higher burden on the plaintiff by not requiring that a supervisor have notice of subordinates’
84
misconduct.
To curb supervisory liability, the Iqbal Court stated that the
“plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,
through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitu85
tion.” This language could indicate that the Court will disfavor any
theory of liability based on tacit conduct by senior officials, including a
86
lack of proper supervision. At the very least, Iqbal’s requirement
87
that plaintiffs plead specific misconduct by officials hinders supervi88
sory liability claims, which are often based on omissions.
89
An even more recent case, Connick v. Thompson, imposes particularly onerous restrictions on a type of supervisory liability - liability for failure to provide adequate training. In an opinion by Justice
Thomas, the Court declined to hold the New Orleans District Attorney liable for repeated failures by prosecutors in a capital case to pro90
duce exculpatory evidence. The Court noted that to prevail on a
claim alleging a failure to train, the plaintiff must show deliberate in91
difference to violations of constitutional rights. The Court also required a substantial quantum of evidence to demonstrate deliberate
indifference, cautioning that a broader view of liability for failure to
92
train would invite the second-guessing of official decisions. Generally, the Court noted, a plaintiff would have to show that defendants
had notice of a “pattern of similar . . . violations” committed by un93
trained employees. Moreover, the Court held that a plaintiff who
overcame this hurdle would also have to show causation by proving
83

129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Id.
85 Id. at 1948 (emphasis added).
86 I took this view in an earlier piece. See Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight, supra
note 5, at 222-23. However, newer decisions have persuaded me that a narrower interpretation is
appropriate. See, e.g., Plair v. City of New York, 789 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting
that courts have continued to find supervisory liability in the Fourth and Eighth Amendment
contexts).
87 Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. REV. 145,
172-79 (2011) (arguing that Iqbal’s specificity requirement reflected incompletely examined
assumptions about both existence of discrimination and frequency of frivolous lawsuits).
88 See, e.g., Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60 (3d Cir.
2011) (failure to train immigration officers).
89 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
90 Id. at 1366.
91 Id. at 1358-60.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 1360.
84
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that the inadequate training gave rise to the challenged conduct of
94
subordinates. Ruling that the plaintiff had not met his burden of
showing deliberate indifference, the Court held that the defendant
could reasonably assume that lawyers working under him had learned
in law school about the importance of disclosing exculpatory evi95
dence. Based on this stirring confidence in the efficacy of legal education, the Court distinguished a prior decision involving alleged violations of constitutional rights by police officers with no formal legal
96
training.
A recent Third Circuit case, Argueta v. Immigration and Customs
97
Enforcement, applies this restrictive approach to damages claims that
arose from August 2006 to April 2008 based on the immigration en98
forcement program Operation Return to Sender (ORTS). ORTS
was an aggressive program that sought to locate, arrest, and remove
99
individuals who had failed to comply with deportation orders. The
agency’s stated objectives reflected legitimate enforcement priorities.
However, the implementation of those priorities apparently caused a
number of serious problems. While senior officials from Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) acknowledged that ICE agents
100
needed consent from occupants to search residences, the Argueta
plaintiffs alleged that agents had repeatedly failed to obtain occu101
pants’ consent. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that agents had
behaved in an intimidating and deceptive manner by surrounding residences in early-morning hours, working with local police officers to
conceal their official affiliation, pounding on doors and windows until
frightened occupants allowed them to enter, and treating occupants
102
103
(including children) with a lack of respect. Citing Iqbal, the court
held that plaintiffs had failed to plausibly allege that ICE senior offi104
cials had notice of these claimed violations.
The Argueta court’s analysis was both artificially narrow and incomplete. The court rigidly defined reasonable notice of the risk of
overreaching, excluding reports of violations in implementation of
94

Id. at 1358.
Id. at 1361.
96 Id. at 1361-62 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989); Bd. of Commissioners, Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997)).
97 643 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011).
98 Id. at 62.
99 Id.; see Bill Ong Hing, Institutional Racism, ICE Raids, and Immigration Reform, 44
U.S.F. L. REV. 307, 331 (2009).
100 Argueta, 643 F.3d at 75.
101 Id. at 64-65.
102 Id.; see Aldana, supra note 43; Evans, supra note 43; Treadwell, supra note 20.
103 Argueta, 643 F.3d at 67-75.
104 Id. at 74-75.
95
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Since ICE employees have roughly
ORTS from another state.
equivalent qualifications throughout the country, a senior federal official administering a nationwide initiative should view problems in one
106
district as indications of trouble elsewhere.
The Argueta court, although it did not cite Connick, also adopted
the latter case’s casual approach to appropriate training. Conceding
107
that some officers had not completed a three-week training course,
the court did not view lack of specific training as a warning sign. It
was sufficient, the court explained, that all officers completed “some
form of basic law enforcement training . . . which presumably would
have covered basic principles governing . . . the entry into a private
108
residence without a judicial warrant.” The Third Circuit’s confidence
seemed misplaced, paralleling the Supreme Court’s blind faith in legal
education.
Argueta, together with Supreme Court cases like Connick and
Iqbal, takes a counterproductive view of the function and responsibility of senior officials. Indeed, the Third Circuit’s stress on the senior
109
status of officials turns tort theory on its head. Senior officials are
the quintessential “cheapest cost avoiders” under Calabresi’s classic
formulation: They can readily obtain information on costs stemming
from subordinates’ wrongful conduct and change practices to reduce

105

Id.
The court’s assertion that some of the reports and lawsuits relied on by plaintiffs postdated the New Jersey raids, id. at 74-75, glided over at least one important counter-example. One
lawsuit, Mancha v. U.S. Immigrations & Customs Enforcement, No. 1:06-CV-2650-TWT, 2009
U.S. Dist. Lexis 27620 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2009), arose from alleged events that occurred in September, 2006, near the beginning of the time-span of the conduct alleged in Argueta. In Mancha,
a fifteen-year-old United States citizen was at home getting ready for school when ICE agents
appeared looking for her mother, who was also a citizen, and engaged in intimidating behavior.
See id. at *11-13 (declining to dismiss FTCA claims). Mancha stemmed from an enforcement
action targeting employees at a poultry plant and apparently did not involve ORTS. Id. at *2-3.
However, the egregious facts of the case, in which several ICE agents entered the home of a
United States citizen, should arguably have been a red flag for senior officials. The case received
nationwide publicity. See Jenny Jarvie, Five Georgians Say They Were Caught Up in Raids for
Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2006, at A10; cf. Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and Removal Procedures: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees,
Border Security, and International Law of the H.R. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 34-36 (Feb. 13,
2008) (including Marie Mancha’s testimony); Arias v. U.S. Immigrations & Customs Enforcement, No. 07-1959, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 34072 (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2008); Arias v. U.S. Immigrations & Customs Enforcement, No. 07-1959, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 61519 (D. Minn. July 17, 2009)
(awarding summary judgment for senior officials on qualified immunity grounds in case involving overly aggressive conduct by subordinates during enforcement action; facts also supported
view that senior officials lacked reasonable notice that such alleged abuses would occur).
107 Argueta, 643 F.3d at 75; see Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1361 (2011).
108 Argueta, 643 F.3d at 75.
109 Id.
106
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110

costs. While senior officials cannot prevent the isolated wrongs of
subordinates, legal norms should encourage diligent inquiry about the
risks and benefits of action. An artificially narrow view of notice
merely encourages senior officials’ myopia.
C.

Qualified Immunity

The specificity two-step recurs in qualified immunity cases. To
overcome the government’s assertion of immunity, the plaintiff must
111
show that the official acted in disregard of “clearly established” law.
Increasingly, courts have viewed “clearly established law” narrowly,
insisting on precedents that precisely match the fact pattern in the
case at bar.
As in other settings, legitimate concerns about hindsight bias
112
113
drive the courts. Consider Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, where the Supreme
Court held that detention of a material witness in a terrorism investigation for the mixed purpose of preserving the witness’s testimony
114
and probing the witness’s own role was not a violation of settled law.
In ruling this way, the Court implicitly recognized that authorities, particularly early in an investigation, will not always be able to distinguish
between those with information about a conspiracy and the conspirators themselves. Forcing the government to make a mechanical distinction, or one based on incomplete information, would be a classic
example of hindsight bias. The Court viewed the Ninth Circuit as falling into the hindsight bias trap when the appellate court found a violation of clearly established law based merely on the “history and pur115
Justice Scalia, writing for the
pose of the Fourth Amendment.”
Court, noted that this nebulous test was pitched at an overly “high
116
level of generality.” Qualified immunity would have little meaning if
officials had to guess at the result of such an amorphous test.

110 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1118 (1972); cf. Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amendment Infrastructure, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 16 (2010) (explaining Calabresi and Melamed’s argument).
111 See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
112 Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (requiring specific pleading and limiting
supervisory liability).
113 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074.
114 Id. at 2083-85. Indeed, the Court held that the challenged practice did not violate the
plaintiff’s rights. Id. at 2080-83. In a concurrence, Justice Kennedy suggested that detaining a
material witness when officials could readily preserve the witness’s testimony with a deposition
might violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 2085-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
115 Id. at 2084 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)).
116 Id.
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Al-Kidd, however, did not deter lower courts from going to the
other extreme and requiring undue specificity in precedents. Since
facts always vary to some degree, a mechanical insistence that the
facts in precedents precisely align with facts in a case at issue allows
most official defendants to argue that no precedent prohibited their
117
particular conduct. Officials aware of this test ex ante have no incentive to avoid the temptations of short-term thinking.
118
Consider here the recent case of Labadie v. United States, in
which Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents at a Canadian border
crossing physically subdued a noncitizen who had simply asked why
119
he was being returned to Canada. The court held that qualified immunity barred the plaintiff’s claim for damages based on a violation of
the First Amendment. The court asserted that noncitizens’ rights to
free speech were not “clearly established” at the time of the alleged
120
assault and that qualified immunity therefore protected the agent.
While the First Amendment rights of noncitizens are unsettled in
121
some respects, it seems hard to imagine that an agent has the power
to physically assault a noncitizen - or anyone else for that matter 122
who merely asks a question. Requiring chapter and verse in existing
precedent merely incentivizes reckless behavior.
D. The FTCA and the Expanding Discretionary Function Exception
123

The “discretionary function” exception of the FTCA completes
the specificity two-step that shields officials. This exception applies
when the government action involves “an element of judgment or
choice,” and the choice “is the kind that the discretionary function
124
exception was designed to shield.” While courts construing the exception rightly accord some deference to official decisions, too many
courts have interpreted the exception with sweeping breadth, discerning policy in officials’ recklessness, indifference, or heedless habit.

117

Id.
Labadie v. United States, No. C09-1276 MJP, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 39527 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 12, 2011).
119 The plaintiff alleged that one of the Border Patrol agents involved in the episode “held
his neck and punched him in the face.” See Labadie v. United States, No. C09-1276, 2011 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 62909, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 14, 2011) (dismissing FTCA claims against individual
agents, since FTCA only permits suits against United States).
120 Labadie, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 39527, at *10-11.
121 See Bosniak, supra note 18.
122 The court denied several defendants’ motions for summary judgment on plaintiffs’
claims of excessive force and unlawful arrest. Labadie, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 39527, at *19-27.
123 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006).
124 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1991).
118
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The Supreme Court set the tone early in Dalehite v. United
125
States, holding that the discretionary function exception shielded
government recklessness in packing and storing fertilizer that the government planned to ship overseas. A cargo of fertilizer that had been
kept at an overly high temperature exploded, killing 560 people,
wounding thousands, and destroying shipping facilities at a Texas
126
town. Despite abundant evidence that officials knew the risks of
127
storing the fertilizer at high temperatures and failed to take protec128
tive measures or warn workers of the risks of explosion, the Court
129
ruled that officials could invoke the exception to liability. Indeed,
the Court viewed officials’ manifest recklessness as supporting the
argument that the exception applied. According to the Court, officials
exercised discretion by deciding that protective measures such as giving the fertilizer more time to cool prior to packaging would have
raised the costs of the program, which supplied fertilizer to countries
130
Ironically, the fertilizer explosion hindered
such as South Korea.
officials’ stated goals by reducing the number of qualified workers and
destroying shipping capacity. Official indifference to this foreseeable
risk was not a policy decision worthy of respect, but a predilection for
Russian roulette that the law should deter.
At least one recent appellate decision in the immigration context
shows the folly of an overly broad definition of policy content under
131
the FTCA. In Castro v. United States, the court ruled that the discretionary function exception shielded Border Patrol agents who deported a United States citizen child along with her noncitizen father,
despite pleas from the child’s citizen mother to allow the child to re132
main in this country in her custody. To prevent this train wreck, the
Border Patrol needed no power of clairvoyance or cornucopia of re125

346 U.S. 15, 35-6 (1953).
Id. at 48 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 39-41.
128 Id. at 55 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 41-42.
130 Id. at 40-41.
131 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 902 (2011).
132 Id. at 269-70. The mother had sought an emergency modification of custody which a
family court would probably have approved. Castro v. United States, 560 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir.
2009). In custody decisions, the governing standard is the “best interests of the child.” While
immigration status should not be the sole determinant of custody, it can be one of the factors
considered by the court. See Rico v. Rodriguez, 120 P.3d 812 (Nev. 2005); cf. David B. Thronson,
Custody and Contradictions: Exploring Immigration Law as Federal Family Law in the Context
of Child Custody, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 453, 509-10 (2008) (discussing Castro case and suggesting
that ICE, in permitting noncitizen father to take along citizen child upon his removal, “determined [custody] without process and without any consideration of the interests of the child”). In
Castro, the United States citizen mother eventually received custody and the daughter returned
to the United States, but this process took another three years.
126
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sources. Officials need only have detained the noncitizen father for a
couple of days instead of removing him immediately. Rather than
encourage this common-sense result, the court took a sweeping view
of the policy content in the Border Patrol’s conduct. According to the
court, detaining the father for even a couple of days would have re133
sulted in increased cost to the government. It therefore entailed a
134
policy choice that fit within the discretionary function exception.
The court did not consider that such split-custody cases are thankfully
rare in immigration law, thus limiting the drain on government budgets. The result in Castro did not protect the Border Patrol from hindsight bias. It merely cloaked heedless routine in the mantle of policy.
IV. THE SLIDING SCALE APPROACH AND THE RETURN TO COMMON
SENSE REMEDIES
Fortunately, case law also demonstrates an alternative to the
specificity two-step. The sliding scale approach rejects the categorical
deference of the specificity two-step, substituting a more granular
analysis of the opportunity costs that a remedy would yield. In rejecting categorical deference, a sliding scale approach would narrow the
“factors counseling hesitation” that preclude Bivens actions; officials
would have to do more than slap a “national security” label on problematic decisions. Similarly, a sliding scale approach would not bar
suits based on supervisory liability. In cases against supervisors for
failure to train subordinates, the sliding scale approach would consider
subordinates’ pre-employment experience and the nature of the interests affected. In the qualified immunity context, the test would consider whether liability would unduly chill official decisions. When a
challenged action is so egregious that it is fundamentally different in
kind from the broad range of acceptable decisions, courts should
broadly define “clearly established law.” In the FTCA arena, courts
should narrowly define the “discretionary function” exception to exclude official action that results from heedlessness or habit.
Sliding scales are common in law. For example, preliminary injunctions balance the prevention of irreparable harm against hardship
to the other party and the movant’s ultimate likelihood of success on
135
the merits. Tort liability balances the probability and gravity of an

133 See Castro v. United States, No. C-06-61, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9440, at *32 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
9, 2007), aff’d, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010).
134 Id. at *31-33.
135 See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008); cf. Richard R.W. Brooks &
Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the Preliminary Injunction
Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381 (2005) (modeling approach to remedies). But see Jared A. Gold-
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event: the more serious the possible harm, the lower the probability
136
will be of the event’s occurrence. In procedural due process, the
court will balance the significance of individual and state interests
137
against the likelihood of error. The sliding scale here is an extension
of that approach.
Moreover, courts have often tempered categorical limits on access to courts with escape hatches that allow relief where the conduct
challenged is sufficiently egregious. In Reno v. American-Arab Anti138
Discrimination Committee, the Court left open the possibility of judicial review when a noncitizen contesting removal alleged selective
enforcement that amounted to “outrageous” discrimination. In INS v.
139
Lopez-Mendoza, the Court said that the exclusionary rule might be
an appropriate remedy for “egregious” violations of liberty and fair140
ness in immigration enforcement. Finally, the Court in qualified immunity cases has warned against undue rigidity in determining
141
whether egregious official actions violated “clearly established” law.
In the following sections, I discuss how to apply this sliding scale approach to factors “counselling hesitation” under Bivens, along with
qualified immunity, supervisory liability, and the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.
A. The Sliding Scale and Availability of Bivens Actions
A sliding scale approach would check courts’ tendency to categorically preclude Bivens actions when officials allege a national secu142
rity connection. As I have discussed in an earlier piece, categorical
deference sends the wrong signal to officials. A more nuanced ap-

stein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 485 (2010) (critiquing balancing
test as unduly subjective and amorphous).
136 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
137 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct.
2507 (2011) (applying Mathews formula to reject categorical due process right to counsel for
indigent parents facing civil contempt for failure to pay child support, while imposing other
procedural safeguards); cf. Linda Kelly Hill, The Right to be Heard: Voicing the Due Process
Right to Counsel for Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 41 (2011) (arguing that due process formula requires counsel for alien children abandoned by their parents, who
otherwise risk inappropriate detention).
138 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999).
139 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984).
140 See Anonymous, Immigr. Ct., Exec. Office Immigr. Rev., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (N.Y. Co.
July 1, 2011) (on file with the author) (Ferris, Immigr. Judge) (suppressing evidence and dismissing removal proceeding based on egregious search that included agents forcing their way into
noncitizen’s home); see also Treadwell, supra note 20 (discussing need for Fourth Amendment
remedies in removal cases).
141 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
142 See Margulies, Judging Myopia, supra note 5.
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proach will be more effective in curbing both myopia and hindsight
bias.
A re-thinking of Bivens remedies would permit a suit when the
agency needed a prod toward innovation. If a plaintiff shows that a
violation is egregious, as in the extraordinary rendition of Maher Arar
to Syria or the failure to follow the agency’s own rules in Badrawi, the
burden should shift to the official to demonstrate that the official has
143
treated other like cases in a lawful manner. Making this showing
would cast the violation at issue as an isolated occurrence where a
remedy will not improve official performance. However, the recent
rash of lawsuits about immigration searches, arrests, and detention
conditions suggests that officials will not be able to meet this stan144
dard. Moreover, Bivens remedies have traditionally been available
145
146
for violations involving searches and conditions of confinement. At
least in the broad run of immigration cases, no other factors suggest
the need for caution.
Similarly, an official should not be able to use the “factors counseling hesitation” prong of Bivens to insulate conduct by slapping a
“national security” label on a challenged decision. Recall Badrawi,
where immigration officials invoked unsupported national security
concerns to justify disregarding clear guidelines on the legal status of
147
noncitizens on temporary employment visas.
Rather than follow
agency rules, the immigration officials in Badrawi in effect made their
148
Under a sliding scale approach, the responsible agents
own law.
would have been obliged to consider alternatives, such as seeking a
warrant to conduct surveillance on Badrawi at his workplace or using
other investigative techniques that did not require a warrant. The opportunity costs of this approach would have been low. A different
calculus would have applied if Badrawi had been likely to abandon his
job and go underground to complete a terrorist plot. However, Badrawi’s request for an extension of his H-1B visa indicated that he
149
wished to keep his position. Badrawi’s consistent pattern of cooperation with immigration authorities could have been an elaborate
ruse. However, viewing a pattern of cooperation as evidence of untrustworthiness recalls the stereotypes that infected the government’s

143

See El Badrawi v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D. Conn. 2011).
See, e.g., Argueta v. U.S. Immigrations & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60 (3d Cir.
2011) (alleging excesses during search).
145 See Pfander, supra note 8.
146 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980).
147 See El Badrawi, 787 F. Supp. 2d 204.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 209-10.
144
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assessment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. Treating
both cooperation and defiance as evidence of untrustworthiness
smacks of “heads I win, tails you lose.” Obliging officials to abandon
such stereotypes is not an opportunity cost that should trigger deference.
B.

Supervisory Liability and Failure to Train

In the supervisory liability context, courts should similarly reject
a categorical approach and narrowly interpret the two precedents in
this area, Iqbal and Connick. Iqbal should be read as preserving supervisory liability when the supervisor has the state of mind necessary
to prove the underlying constitutional violation. Connick should be
read as permitting failure to train cases to proceed under a sliding
scale approach with two interactive variables: 1) the pre-employment
experience of subordinate personnel, and 2) the nature of the interests
violated.
1. Intent Not Required
A threshold question here is whether Iqbal categorically bars
claims based on supervisory liability. A categorical approach would
clash with the sliding scale approach recommended here. Fortunately,
a more tempered reading of Iqbal is plausible. On this view, Iqbal
only bars claims based on supervisory liability where the plaintiff has
151
not plausibly pleaded that the supervisor has the state of mind required for the underlying constitutional violation. The violations of
equal protection at issue in Iqbal required proof of discriminatory
152
intent. However, a plaintiff need not show intent to prove that officials violated other constitutional provisions.
When the underlying violation, as in the Fourth Amendment
arena, does not require intent, Iqbal should not bar the claim. For
153
example, in Argueta v. ICE, plaintiffs alleged that ICE agents, acting
on orders from superiors and without adequate training, had violated
the Fourth Amendment by entering homes without the consent of
occupants, verbally abusing those inside, and manhandling children.
150 ERIC L. MULLER, AMERICAN INQUISITION: THE HUNT FOR JAPANESE AMERICAN
DISLOYALTY IN WORLD WAR II 16-18 (2007) (analyzing government stereotypes of JapaneseAmericans); Joseph Margulies, Evaluating Crisis Government, 40 CRIM. L. BULLETIN 627, 638-39
(2004) (discussing other World War II measures singling out Asian-Americans and Pacific islanders).
151 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008); Sherry, supra
note 87.
152 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948-49.
153 Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 64 (3d Cir. 2011).
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The district court held that proof of the officials’ knowledge of these
154
The
practices was sufficient in the Fourth Amendment context.
155
Third Circuit expressly reserved this issue.
2. Failure to Train, Experience, and the Nature of Underlying
Interests
This still leaves the question of liability for failure to train subordinates. The Court’s decisions in Iqbal¸ Connick v. Thompson, and
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd suggest the need for limits on actions based on
156
failure to train. However, these actions remain viable, using a sliding
scale approach that considers the pre-employment experience of the
subordinates and the nature of the interest allegedly violated.
Suppose that subordinate personnel, instead of having a law
school degree like the subordinates in Connick, have little or no pre157
employment legal training. Since problems with compliance would
be even more foreseeable in this context, a reasonable supervisor
should take greater precautions. The case for training would be even
stronger if the enforcement measure involved a sensitive area where
immigration authorities have historically been reticent, such as the
home.
Viewed with a sliding scale approach, consider the facts alleged in
158
Diaz-Bernal v. Myers.
According to the plaintiffs, in an earlymorning raid in June 2007, ICE personnel entered homes without
159
warrants and arrested individuals without probable cause. ICE officials also detained the plaintiffs without knowing their immigration
160
status and failed to inform the plaintiffs of their rights. Each person
161
was detained for 3 to 27 days before being released.
Factors that support the liability of senior officials in Diaz-Bernal
include the modest amount of legal training provided to subordinates;
162
reports from other districts of problems with similar measures; and
154 Argueta v. U.S. Immigrations & Customs Enforcement, No. 08-1652, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis
6912, at *18-19 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 643 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011); Plair v.
City of New York, 789 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2011).
155 Argueta, 643 F.3d at 68.
156 See Scott v. Fischer, 616 F.3d 100, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (analyzing supervisory liability after
Iqbal).
157 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1361-63 (2011).
158 Diaz-Bernal v. Myers, 758 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Conn. 2010). In a recent settlement, the
federal government agreed to pay damages and provide immigration relief to the Diaz-Bernal
plaintiffs. See Mary E. O’Leary, 11 Immigrants Arrested in 2007 Raids in New Haven Win $350K
Settlement with Feds, Won’t Be Deported, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, Feb. 15, 2012.
159 Id. at 112-13.
160 Id. at 113.
161 Id. at 114.
162 Id.

2011]

Noncitizens’ Remedies Lost?

345

the operation’s focus on residences, where overzealous enforcement
could also impair privacy interests and affect children who might be
163
Moreover, perhaps because of the greater
United States citizens.
privacy protections that attach in an individual’s home, immigration
164
enforcement actions have historically centered on other sites. New
programs are more prone to error, requiring more attention by senior
officials. The failure to provide this attention suggests an absence of
deliberation that accountability should remedy. In addition, while the
Third Circuit questioned in Argueta whether reports from other dis165
tricts could be appropriate notice of potential problems, discounting
such reports should be evidence of senior officials’ lack of due diligence. Federal programs should be replicable across the country. Officials becoming aware of such reports should investigate further to
eliminate systemic causes rather than assume that “bad apples” caused
the problems. If an investigation revealed evidence of systemic problems, senior officials should modify the training provided or the program itself. A more deferential judicial stance merely encourages senior officials’ heedlessness.
C.

Qualified Immunity

The sliding scale approach to qualified immunity would consider
two factors: the egregiousness of the official action and the specificity
of precedent. When conduct is egregious, a plaintiff can invoke even
166
This balance exgeneral precedents as “clearly established” law.
plains decisions that appear inconsistent under the present test, which
asks only whether the challenged action has violated settled precedents.
A sliding scale approach would best curb both myopia and hindsight bias. It would not consign plaintiffs to the often impossible mission of finding precedents that exactly matched the facts alleged. On
the other hand, a sliding scale approach would stabilize the opportunity costs of a decision against officials.
To see how a sliding scale would work in the qualified immunity
167
context, consider Hope v. Pelzer, in which the Court ruled that

163

See Aldana, supra note 43; Treadwell, supra note 20.
See Hing, supra note 99.
165 See Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 74-75 (3d Cir.
2011) (suggesting that reports from other immigration districts, some of which concerned violations that occurred after events alleged in instant case, did not constitute adequate notice of
possible violations).
166 The plaintiff must plead plausible facts demonstrating that qualified immunity does not
require dismissal of a cause of action. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011).
167 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
164
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clearly established law barred officials from tying the plaintiff, a state
prison inmate, to a hitching post in the hot sun for seven hours. The
Court ruled that clearly established law barred this practice even in
the absence of a judicial decision that squarely addressed the particu168
lar facts at issue. According to the Court, the Fifth Circuit had taken
an unduly “rigid” approach by requiring prior precedent that ex169
Justice Souter, writing for the
pressly prohibited such conduct.
Court, noted that qualified immunity does not require such a pains170
taking match. Instead, the Court viewed precedent more broadly as
establishing that once officials have secured an inmate’s compliance
with rules, punishment for past rule infractions should not endanger
171
an inmate’s physical health. Viewed in this light, overcoming qualified immunity in Hope did not increase opportunity costs. After the
decision, an official might avoid a swath of conduct wider than the
precise conduct at issue. For example, instead of merely refraining
from chaining a prisoner to a hitching post for seven hours, a reasonable official would probably avoid even a six hour stint. However, this
reluctance would not compromise valid prison administration con172
cerns.
Such an approach would have yielded a different approach in
173
Labadie v. United States, in which a Canadian national seeking to
enter the United States alleged that a Border Patrol agent had resorted to using force in response to a polite question. Instead of looking in a mechanical way at the lack of clear case law on entering noncitizens’ First Amendment rights, a court would consider whether
permitting such a lawsuit to proceed to discovery would yield substan-

168 Id. at 740-41; see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) (noting that child
welfare official who sold foster child into slavery would be liable, despite absence of cases expressly declaring such conduct illegal); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (qualified immunity doctrine does not require that the “very action in question has previously been held
unlawful”). But see al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2084 (in case where Court found that detention of
material witness under presumptively valid warrant to ensure witness’s testimony in terrorism
case did not violate Fourth Amendment, even though government may have also wished to
investigate witness’s own terrorist ties, Court warned against defining clearly established law at a
“high level of generality”).
169 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 742 (2002).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 This is different from the situation in al-Kidd, where finding an official liable for detaining a witness in a terrorism investigation prior to the witness’s flight to Saudi Arabia might encourage future officials to let a future witness get on the plane, even when compulsory process
might not run to that jurisdiction. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2084. In that scenario, officials might
have lost important evidence, thereby raising opportunity costs. Id; see Margulies, Judging Myopia, supra note 5, at 233.
173 Labadie v. United States, No. C09-1276, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 62909 (W.D. Wash. June 14,
2011).
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tial opportunity costs. If permitting the lawsuit would chill effective
border control, the court would hold that qualified immunity required
dismissal. However, permitting discovery would likely not chill enforcement if courts also required an entering noncitizen to plead plausibly that he or she had behaved in a respectful manner.
Refining qualified immunity doctrine in this fashion would encourage greater official diligence and promote efficient dispute resolution. Agents would have an incentive to promptly document occasions when they deemed it necessary to use force. In considering
whether the officer’s response was egregious or tailored to the situation, a court could also consider any past episodes that might have
174
heightened the officer’s concern. Officials would develop a more
nuanced institutional memory to inform their conduct, heading off
incidents before they happen. When litigation does result, information that clarified issues would be available to both the court and op175
posing parties, enhancing the prospects of a quick settlement. A sliding scale approach would have positive systemic effects, without the
opportunity costs that qualified immunity doctrine has sought to reduce.
D. The FTCA and the Appropriate Scope of Discretionary
Functions
A sliding scale would also make sense in the FTCA context, tempering the deference that has too often distorted development of the
“discretionary function” exception to liability. When opportunity
costs are low, courts should require a closer nexus between the challenged action and the management of policy.
A first category of FTCA claims involves violations of clear constitutional or statutory rights. Where the law is clear, there is no discretion. Thus, even senior officials’ acts would not be covered by the
exception if those acts entailed blinking at clear unconstitutional con176
duct, such as entering residences without a warrant or consent. Similarly, a decision hinging on a patently erroneous interpretation of a
174 Id. at *2-3 (discussing past physical altercation between plaintiff and one of the Border
Patrol agents named as a defendant in the instant case).
175 This inquiry into the parties’ conduct would entail some preliminary consideration of
the underlying merits of the case. However, as the Court has recently recognized in the class
action context, such an inquiry is often necessary to ensure that justice is done. See Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 (2011) (asserting that proof of commonality between class members’
claims “necessarily overlaps with . . . [the] merits” of plaintiffs’ claim that defendant engaged in
widespread discrimination).
176 U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. U.S., 837 F. 2d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 1988) (“conduct cannot be
discretionary if it violates the Constitution, a statute, or an applicable regulation. Federal officials
do not possess discretion to violate constitutional rights or federal statutes”).
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federal statute or rule would not involve “judgment or choice” within
177
the meaning of the exception.
A sliding scale approach would have led to a different result in
178
Castro v. United States, in which the court held that the discretionary
function exception applied to Border Patrol agents who deported a
United States citizen child along with her noncitizen father. The Border Patrol ignored a request from the child’s citizen mother to allow
the child to stay. The agents’ choice was appropriate only if one accepts the premise that the Border Patrol had to remove the father
immediately. However, the agents would not have impaired immigration enforcement if they had detained the father for a few days to allow Castro to obtain a custody order. Only a handful of cases involve
a choice in custody of a citizen child between a citizen parent and an
undocumented parent. Detaining a handful of noncitizens for the
brief period necessary for an emergency custody hearing would not
raise costs overall. Given such low opportunity costs, the sliding scale
approach would have found the discretionary function exception in179
applicable.
V. CONCLUSION
Remedies for alleged overreaching in immigration enforcement
create a dilemma. Unduly sparse remedies promote official myopia.
Overly plentiful remedies encourage hindsight bias and chill official
discretion. With the specificity two-step, courts have avoided the sec177 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1991). The FTC also waives sovereign
immunity for claims of false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and other traditional torts arising out of law enforcement activities. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). In El Badrawi v.
United States, 787 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D. Conn. 2011)., the court granted summary judgment to the
plaintiff on his false arrest claim, rightly declining to defer to regional immigration officials’ ad
hoc rewriting of a federal regulation. Officials had taken the view that a noncitizen was not
lawfully present in the United States when the noncitizen had complied with a regulation that
granted an extension of authorized employment for H-1B visa-holders who filed a timely request
for an extension of their visa status. See id. at 217 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(b)(20)). According
to the court, the regulation clearly extended the noncitizen’s period of lawful presence since no
reasonable drafter could have contemplated that a noncitizen on an employment visa be authorized to work yet not be lawfully present. Because immigration officials’ decision to arrest the
plaintiff rested on this indefensible ground, the court found for the plaintiff on his false arrest
claim. Id. at 216-224; cf. Douglas v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1366 (M.D. Fla. 2011)
(granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim where plaintiff was detained because ICE agent ignored detailed letter regarding his citizenship status).
178 Castro v. United States, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 902 (2011).
179 For a case where application of the exception was appropriate, consider Rodriguez v.
United States, 415 Fed. Appx. 143 (11th Cir. 2011), in which the court ruled that the exception
covered a decision to leave exercise equipment unattended, which allegedly caused an injury to a
detainee who used equipment in an unsafe manner. Requiring constant supervision of exercise
equipment would make recreation programs for immigration detainees more expensive, either
limiting their availability or curtailing other valuable programs.
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ond problem but exacerbated the first. The result has been a dilution
of Bivens and causes of action under the FTCA. A sliding scale approach redresses the balance, leaving discretion intact but encouraging
a second look at heedless habits that do not serve enforcement goals.

